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Abstract 
In an environment of strongly decreasing banana productivity, we analyse whether an increase in the average 
productivity of a reference group a farmer belongs to, has a positive effect on that individual farmer’s 
harvest.  The increase in average productivity is supposedly caused by the adoption of productivity enhancing 
techniques.  So we measure the externalities of a productivity increase in one farmer’s banana field. For our 
analysis we have data on three social groups, namely kinship members, neighbours and social insurance 
group members. We find the strongest social effects within kinship related groups.  We do find exogenous 
social effects between neighbours: there is a positive effect of neighbours’ education level.  But only within 
kinship related groups we find the true endogenous effects that produce the social multiplier in banana 
productivity.   
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Technology adoption in farmer’s livelihood systems can become an important element of 
daily survival.  In Kagera, in Tanzania, farmers observe a severe productivity decline of 
the banana, which is their main staple food.  Population pressure in the area is high and soil 
fertility decreases strongly.  Moreover, the indigenous banana suffers from many diseases 
and pests.  Therefore, NGOs and farmer extension centres introduced new technologies in 
the region.  Farmers can decide to plant new banana varieties, originating from other parts 
of Eastern Africa or from Latin America, or to adopt techniques that mitigate the negative 
effects of diseases and weevil attacks.  A broad range of literature on the adoption of a new 
technology exists
1
.  It is often found that the probability of adoption is influenced by some 
individual characteristics of the farmer such as his human capital, the degree of risk 
aversion, farm size.  Additional to a farmer’s individual characteristics, a farmer’s 
behaviour can be influenced by other farmers’ behaviour.  Extensive work is done on this 
type of social interactions in technology adoption (Case, 1992; Ellison and Fudenberg, 
1993, 1995; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Gale, 1996; Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Udry and 
Conley, 2001; Bandiera and Rasul, 2001).     
In our work we will start from the fact that the productivity of the indigenous banana is 
decreasing and that techniques to mitigate the negative effects are available to the farmers.  
Farmers can learn about a new technology via different sources.  A farmer can directly 
learn it from extension services or other forms of communication, e.g. pamphlets, books, 
radio.  These farmers are the innovators or the experimenting farmers in the village.  But 
farmers can also learn about a new technology via other farmers.  Moreover, the positive or 
negative attitude of other farmers in a reference group towards the new technology, may 
influence individual behaviour.  We will not analyse behaviour in adopting the techniques 
directly, but rather look at banana output, which is an indirect measure of farmers’ 
behaviour.  Additional to a farmer’s characteristics, we will analyse how the output of a 
reference group can affect output of an individual farmer belonging to that group.  We 
                                                 
1
  A survey of the literature on adoption of agricultural innovations in developing countries can be found 
in Feder, Just and Zilberman, 1985.  
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assume that group output will affect individual output in the next agricultural season 
because of transmission of productivity enhancing techniques. 
Analysing social interactions is not straightforward.  Positive effects of group behaviour on 
individual behaviour can easily be misinterpreted as social effects, while in fact they are 
due to characteristics common to all members in a reference group.  Severe identification 
problems exist while analysing contemporaneous behaviour. This problem was defined by 
Manski (1993, 2000) as the reflection problem.  Group behaviour influences individual 
behaviour but each individual affects mean group behaviour so there is a simultaneity bias.  
Manski and others (e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001) have investigated alternative models that 
mitigate the simultaneity in the model. 
Amongst other solutions, they propose to have individual behaviour vary with lagged 
rather than with contemporaneous group behaviour.  A precondition is that the researcher a 
priori knows the appropriate lag length.  With respect to the lag length in growing bananas 
we believe we have data that cover the appropriate time lag.  We have data on a small 
village in Tanzania.  The survey covered the course of one year, but some questions on 
agricultural output were asked retrospectively about the year before the survey.  Since a 
banana tree needs approximately one year to reach the flowering stage, we assume that the 
one year lag is appropriate to measure possible social interaction effects.  Another 
alternative Manski and others propose is to use a non-linear model, which also presumes 
knowing the correct non-linear function.  Or one could use another feature of group 
behaviour, such as the median instead of the mean, but again one has to know a priori the 
relevant feature.  And the last alternative they offer is to use instrumental variables that 
directly affect outcome of some but not all group members.   
Besley and Case (1993) have also addressed some of the problems of using cross-sectional 
data.  They argue that coefficients will be biased due to changing farmer characteristics, 
e.g. credit availability and a farmer’s knowledge about the new technology.  Both a 
farmer’s credit situation and his knowledge can change over time.  We assume that credit 
availability does not influence adoption because the new banana varieties are often freely 
distributed at markets.  As for the techniques, some of them do require inputs, but most of 
them do not.  In our paper, a farmer’s knowledge about techniques will be represented by 
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the lagged agricultural behaviour of his reference group since we assume he learns about 
techniques via these other farmers. 
A serious problem researchers encounter when using datasets that were not specifically 
collected to analyse social effects, is the identification of the reference group.  Manski 
argues that not knowing the exact group composition seriously worsens the reflection 
problem.  Because of data constraints many authors use geographical reference group 
boundaries such as the whole village (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995), district (Case, 1992) 
or ethnicity (Borjas, 1992, 1998) as the reference group.  These are large reference groups 
but the relevant group may be at a much smaller level
2
.  From our survey
3
 we found that 
the persons inside the village a farmer learns techniques from, or asks agricultural advice 
from (representing a farmer’s agricultural information network), are significantly more 
often kinship related, social insurance network members, clan members or living relatively 
close together, compared to the households that do not have a learning or advice link.  
Therefore, we believe these groups are good proxies for the correct agricultural 
information group.  On these groups we have full information on all members living in the 
same village (there was no sampling procedure; all the households in the village were 
included in the survey).   
Having information on all the group members gives us two additional important 
advantages to solve the simultaneity problem.  Firstly, we can exclude the behaviour of the 
farmer himself from his average lagged group behaviour.  Secondly, within each group we 
can identify the (relatively) most productive farmers.  Since we assume the most 
productive farmers will be teachers rather than learners, including them could bias our 
results. 
In the next section we will present an analytical framework for our analysis, mainly drawn 
from Berger (1985), Udry and Conley (2001) and Manski (1993) and we propose a social 
                                                 
2
  Brock and Durlauf (2001) describe the difference between global and local interactions.  In the case of 
global interactions each individual assigns an identical weight to the behaviour of every other member 
of the population.  In the case of local interactions the model assumes that each agent interacts directly 
with only a finite number of others in the population.   
3
  The survey contains questions about agricultural advisers such as “if you encountered a serious problem 
with any of your crops whom would you turn to for advice”.  There is also a section on banana growing 
techniques known by the farmer (household head) and whom he learned them from.   
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interactions test.  In section three we continue with the description of the data with respect 
to learning and advice seeking behaviour of the farmers in a small village in Tanzania.  
Section four is the empirical part, where we test for social interactions between farmers.  
We will look at whether individual banana output is affected by the lagged average banana 
productivity in a reference group (which was called by Manski the endogenous social 
effect).  We will also correct for individual characteristics and exogenous group 
characteristics such as education level and age composition of the group (exogenous social 
effects).   
We find the strongest endogenous social effects within kinship related groups.  In our 
sample we do not find social effects within social insurance groups once corrected for 
exogenous characteristics.  This points out the fact that these groups are probably formed 
on the basis of characteristics that drive not only group formation, but productivity of the 
group members in the same way.  We also find exogenous social effects within neighbour 
groups.  In the last type of groups we find public effects of neighbours’ primary education 
(completed primary or seven years of primary), complementary to the private effects of 
some years of education (four years).  But only within kinship related groups we find the 
endogenous effects that produce the social multiplier effect.  When we look deeper into the 
direct effects of information obtained by group members, again we find the most positive 
effects within kinship related groups indicating that at least part of the endogenous social 
effect is due to information spillovers. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
We use the theoretical framework on Bayesian updating of beliefs provided in chapter four 
of Berger (1985), the target input model (Udry and Conley, 2001; Foster and Rosenzweig, 
1995) and Manski’s reflection problem (1993) as the basis for our empirical test of social 
interactions.  In target input models the optimal level of inputs is unknown and stochastic.  
The target input model starts from the point that an individual has to make a quantitative 
decision about an action to undertake, more specifically in the right amount of input when 
applying a new technology.  A Bayesian framework is used where farmer i has some prior 
beliefs about the right amount of input and he updates his beliefs each period.  New 
information is revealed by experimenting himself or by the experiments of other farmers.  
We will use the same Bayesian framework, not to learn about the optimal amount of a new 
input but to learn the actual benefits of adoption.  Besley and Case (1994) also analysed the 
process of updating expectations on profitability for HYV cotton.   
In our case, farmer i has some prior beliefs about the benefit (production gain minus effort) 
of applying a technique.  In the first period he believes the production gain of applying the 
technique is not worth the effort or there will be no production gain at all.  There is a 
question in the survey that confirms this assumption.  When farmers were asked about the 
reasons of not applying a technique they knew, many answered that the technique was too 
difficult, not yet necessary on their farm or too costly.  But each period more information is 
revealed about the true benefits by other farmers, who do apply the technique, and farmer i 
can update his beliefs using this newly revealed information.  When farmer i starts 
believing the benefits are positive, he also applies the technique.  We assume this process 
to be the underlying reason for productivity of group members to be related. 
We start from farmer i’s observation that his productivity is declining.  We assume 
productivity enhancing techniques are available and he considers applying them to limit 
the loss he faces, though he is not convinced about their possible benefit.  Some of the 
techniques available were only recently introduced to the farmers by farmer extension 
officers.  To some of the techniques there may be an effort attached.  For example, a 
technique exists to prevent weevils from attacking the banana plant (Annex A.1).  The 
farmer has to put some freshly cut pieces of the banana stem around the plant.  Those 
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pieces will attract the weevils before they reach the plant.  The farmer has to clean these 
cut pieces from weevils attached to the bottom at regular times, e.g. at least once a day.  
Some periods of the day may be better suited to clean these weevil traps, e.g. in the 
morning.   
Assume a farmer in the village knows about the existence of a technique and at t-1 he has 
prior beliefs on the benefits (production gain minus effort) of applying the technique, .  
Suppose the prior  is a normally distributed function with unknown mean 
1−tB
11−tB −tβ  and 
known variance .  The true benefit of the technique 2 1−tτ X  is also a normally distributed 
function, of which all farmers know the variance  -since they know the banana 
production function and no additional risk is attached to the techniques- but not the mean, 
2σ
B .  We assume, rather unrealistically, X  to be identically and independently distributed 
across time and farmers.  So in period t-1 farmer i believes that the benefit of applying the 
technique is 1−tβ , which we assume to be negative and he does not apply the technique.  
Other farmers with other (positive) priors do apply the technique.  Suppose farmer i can 
perfectly observe the production gain on other farmers’ fields and can learn about the effort 
put into it without noise in period t.  Farmer i updates his beliefs about the benefits of the 
technique taking into account his own prior beliefs and the information revealed by the 
experimenting farmers ( tx  is the average benefit of the n farmers).  The more convinced 
he is about his own prior beliefs, the less weight the experimental outcomes will have in 
his updating.  The posterior function )Xf (B  will also be normally distributed with mean 
)(xtβ  and variance .  If n farmers are experimenting and the information from their 
experiments reaches farmer i in the same way, then it holds that (Berger, 1985; Foster and 
Rosenzweig, 1995; Udry and Conley, 2001) 
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)(xtβ  can be positive and farmer i can start applying the technique in period t.  In the 
presented case farmer i learns from all n experimenting farmers in the same way and 
without any noise.  However, both the assumptions of full and of perfect information are 
rather unrealistic.  Udry and Conley (2001) find for pineapple growing farmers in Ghana 
that information flows via sparse networks rather than through the whole village.  
Following the authors we will also assume that information is restricted to networks or 
farmers do not learn from all other farmers in the same way.  Also the assumption of full 
information between farmers will be dropped.  Therefore we will adapt (1) and (2) to hold 
first for imperfect information and then we will further adjust it to correct for different 
relationships between farmers. 
First, we assume that information does not reach farmer i perfectly, but with some noise.  
Instead of observing  he observes tx tt ux + .  u  is the measurement error, independent 
from  and normally distributed with mean 0 and variance .  Suppose there are two 
farmers i and j.  We assume that farmer i can still observe the production gain perfectly but 
the effort is communicated with noise.  The posterior beliefs of farmer i will be 
t
tx
2δ
))( tuBf +( tx .  Since  is  and  is  and x and u are 
independent ( ) then h  is .  The farmer’s beliefs about the 
benefits of the technique are updated in the following way (Berger, 1985; Udry and 
Conley, 2001): 
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where the farmer attaches more weight to his prior beliefs. 
The updating of beliefs may be dependent on the relationship with the experimenting 
farmer as suggested by Udry and Conley.  In the next step we try to formalize this by 
making the measurement error dependent on the relationship between the farmers.  We 
assume the variance of the noise is small if farmers have a close relationship, e.g. if they 
know each other since a long time and trust each other very well.  This may be so for 
farmers belonging to the same family or the same social insurance network.  The variance 
of the noise is large if the information is revealed by a farmer with whom farmer i has no 
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special relationship.  As such the outcomes of farmers are weighed differently, depending 
on the value farmers attach to information from different sources.  In the limit,  goes to 
zero for the closest farmers and it goes to infinity for farmers not known at all.   
2δ
 For 02 →δ  : t
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 For 2 ∞→δ  : 1)( −= tt x ββ   (5) 
When  goes to infinity, farmer i does not use the information revealed by the 
experimenting farmers and his prior beliefs are not updated. 
2δ
This theory suggests that farmers can learn from each other, but not from all farmers in the 
same way.  Information does not flow perfectly between farmers and in some networks the 
variance of the noise is smaller than in others.  This is the type of information the farmer 
will take into account to update his beliefs on the benefit of a technique.  In our empirical 
work we aim to test whether social learning between farmers in a network exists.  In most 
of the literature the farmers taken to be the farmer’s network members are all the farmers 
of the neighbourhood, the village, the district or the same ethnicity.  However, these are all 
expected interaction groups.  Because of data limitations many authors are forced to use 
these expected interaction groups.  Recently, some authors collected information on the 
exact interaction groups farmers belong too.  Udry and Conley (2000) collected data on the 
information network of pineapple growing farmers in Ghana e.g. by asking for a list of 
persons whether and how many times they talked to a certain person.  Bandiera and Rasul 
(2001) use a dataset on adoption of sunflower in Mozambique.  They asked how many 
other adopters farmers knew e.g. within their family, neighbourhood or group of church 
members.  We also have information on actual social groups a farmer is part of, e.g. social 
insurance networks, kinship networks and geographical networks. We will show in part 
three that these groups are good proxies for a farmer’s information network.  Moreover, 
since we have data on all farmers in one village, we know the exact exogenous 
characteristics of all group members.  The dataset contains detailed network information 
on who is part of whose social insurance network, on blood bonds between households, on 
exact geographical distances between households, or on clan members.   
 9
For those network members that are living in the same village as farmer i, we will assume 
they visit each other often enough to watch closely the proceedings on the other’s farm.  
Moreover, if good outcomes are observed, farmers inform each other on what was done to 
achieve this outcome, e.g. what kind of techniques were used and how exactly they were 
applied.  Hence we have found a good way to test learning from network members.  If one 
of the network members j finds an effective technique and the exact way of applying it, 
which results in better productivity of his banana farm, he can pass this information on to 
other network members i.  If network member i rightly uses the information he received, 
we expect productivity to rise on network member i’s farm too.  So our social learning test 
will take the following form: 
 ),( 1,, −= tiiti Zfx β      (6) 
with  is the benefit of farmer i in period t.   is a vector of the characteristics of farmer 
i and 
tix ,
i
iZ
1, −tβ  is farmer i’s belief about the benefit (or expected benefit) of applying a 
technique.  As we have showed (3) 1, −tiβ  is a function of the beliefs of farmer i prior to 
experimentation and of the average benefit on the experimenting farmer’s fields in period 
t-1.  In the test we will assume that his prior belief about the benefit is zero and only 
include the last part, the average benefit on his network members’ fields ( jx ).   
 ),( 1,, −= tjiti xZfx  (7) 
We assume the process takes the following chronology: in period t-1 farmer i receives 
information about  on his network member j’s farm (for all J network members) and 
asks what kind of techniques farmer j used in period t-2 to obtain this result.  If farmer i’s 
updated beliefs about the true benefit of the technique are larger than zero, he will try out 
these techniques on his own farm in period t-1 and he will obtain increased harvest results 
in period t.  So we assume 
1, −tjx
1, −tjx  to have a positive effect on  if farmers really learn 
from each other and to have no significant effect otherwise.  Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) 
also investigated the relationship between neighbours’ cumulative experiences (or 
neighbours’ profitability of adoption) and farmer’s profitability.  Udry and Conley’s 
findings (2000) suggest that a farmer increases his fertiliser use after someone in his 
tix ,
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information network achieves higher than expected profits from increased use of fertiliser, 
which in turn will increase his own profits. 
What we test is an example of what is described in Manski (1993, 2000) as endogenous 
social effects.  However, the identification of endogenous social effects may pose some 
serious problems.  There have been many debates on how exactly society affects an 
individual and whether “real” social effects actually exist.  Another problem was how to 
model them empirically (Brock and Durlauf, 2001).  Manski describes and formalizes three 
hypotheses that exist to explain the observation that individuals in the same social group 
tend to behave similarly, only one of which are true social effects.  Firstly, endogenous 
effects can play a role, where individual behaviour varies with or is affected by group 
behaviour.  So there is an endogenous effect if, ceteris paribus, individual outcome tends to 
vary with group achievement.  Secondly, there can be exogenous effects, where an 
individual’s behaviour varies with exogenous characteristics of the group he is part of.  For 
example, if outcome varies with the socio-demographic characteristics of the group, there 
are exogenous effects.  Finally, correlated effects can explain individual behaviour, where 
individuals in the same group behave similarly because they have similar individual 
characteristics or face the same institutional environment.  For example, if outcome varies 
similarly across group members because they face the same production constraints, there 
are correlated effects.  All three effects have different policy implications.  Manski gives 
the example of high school students.  If a tutoring programme is implemented for some of 
the students, then there can be important social multipliers if there are endogenous effects.  
Then the programme does not only affect the achievement of the tutored students, but 
indirectly also affects the achievement of other students in the group.  The other two 
effects do not generate this social multiplier effect.   
Manski tackles the problem of the identification of the endogenous social effects, which is 
not straightforward.  A serious problem encountered in trying to identify social 
interactions, is the so-called reflection problem.  The reflection problem arises because the 
behaviour of the farmers in the reference group affects the behaviour of an individual 
farmer in that group but the behaviour of that farmer affects group behaviour.  So there is a 
strong simultaneity problem.  One of the possible solutions Manski offers to solve the 
simultaneity bias is to make the model dynamic and assume a lag in the transmission of 
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social effects.  So including lagged group behaviour instead of contemporaneous group 
behaviour can be necessary though not sufficient for identification.  Only if the process of 
social effects is observed out of equilibrium including lagged group behaviour may be a 
solution to the identification problem.  Moreover, the timing of the lag has to be known.  
We claim that both conditions are present in our data set.  Since not many farmers are 
applying the techniques yet and feel they are not yet necessary on their farm or too 
difficult, this is clear evidence of an out-of-equilibrium situation.  We also claim the one 
year time lag is appropriate since the banana plants take approximately one year to become 
fully grown and flowering.  Our results will even suffer less from the simultaneity bias 
since we have exact data on all group members and can exclude the observation of farmer i 
from the lagged average. 
So equation (7) represents the pure endogenous effects model where it is assumed that the 
coefficients of the exogenous and correlated effects are zero.  In the presented form the test 
has not only been used to analyse social interactions in the adoption and effects of a new 
technology or in output performance, where the channel of social interactions is mainly 
information but in other types of behaviour as well, where the social interaction is 
exhibited via norms.  For example, Borjas (1992) tested social interactions via the effect of 
average earnings within the same ethnic group as the parents on current earnings of the 
children, via peer pressure of that group on the parents.  Bertrand, e.a. (2000) used a 
similar basic test to analyse welfare use and how being part to a social group may inhibit 
mobility.  Krishnan (2001) analysed the fertility behaviour of Indian women.    
Obviously, the assumption of zero exogenous effects in equation (7) is a very strong one.  
Many authors are forced to make this assumption because data on exogenous 
characteristics of group members is not readily available.  It is a typical omitted variables 
problem which results in biased estimates of the coefficient on 1, −tjx .  Therefore we drop 
the assumption of zero coefficients for the exogenous effects by including them explicitly 
in the test.  The coefficient of the correlated effects is assumed zero since all surveyed 
farmers live in the same village and face the same environmental factors.  It seems evident 
to include the factors that explain exogenous social effects since outcome may be driven by 
group members’ characteristics and not by group behaviour as such.  If we exclude the 
exogenous effects, the endogenous effect may be overestimated.   
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This argument holds even stronger in the case where social groups are endogenously 
formed, such as social insurance networks (De Weerdt, 2002).  So far we assumed that the 
rules of group formation do not have any effect on the identification of the social effects.  
But when possible, individuals endogenously sort themselves into groups.  For example, 
farmers will try to link up with farmers who have certain characteristics or abilities.  The 
sorting of social insurance groups is a purely endogenous process.  For our sample De 
Weerdt (2001) finds that characteristics such as kinship, clan, distance, education and 
wealth determine social insurance group formation.  When endogenous matching takes 
place, there is potential for self-selection bias
4
 and we may misinterpret the endogenous 
social effects.  The variables that drive group formation may also drive farmers’ outcomes 
but there are no endogenous social effects.  Therefore we will have to separate the 
exogenous group characteristics from the group behaviour itself and our test becomes: 
    ),,( 1,, jtjiti ZxZfx −=  (8) 
If the coefficient 1, −tjx  is non-zero, then there are endogenous social effects.  If the 
coefficient vector of jZ  is significantly different from zero, there are exogenous social 
effects.  An alternative method to estimate the endogenous social effects proposed by 
Manski, could be to apply a two-stage method in the guise of a spatial correlation model: 
   i = 1,…,N iiiNi uzYWy ++= ηβ '
Where  is an Nx1 vector of sample realizations y and W  is a 
weighting vector, with non-negative components summing to one.   is a vector with 
individual characteristics.  This model can be estimated by maximum likelihood.  It was 
applied, for example, by Case (1992). 
),...,1,( NiyY i == iN
'
iz
                                                 
4
  Brock and Durlauf (2001) show that self-selection may actually facilitate identification.  Self-selection 
may induce the sort of non-linearities that generate identification of the endogenous effects. 
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Identification of both effects is strongly dependent on the correct identification of the 
reference group.  Most studies use a variable that captures average behaviour of the whole 
expected reference group which is used for all observations in that group as an explanatory 
variable.  Hence the average behaviour and average exogenous characteristics are not 
individual specific variables but lie at the village or neighbourhood level and are therefore 
only estimates of village specific variables.  We have information on individual specific 
reference groups and on all members’ exogenous characteristics since all were included in 
the sample.  Not many authors have the advantage of working with data on exact group 
composition (Udry and Conley, 2002; Bandiera and Rasul, (2001) and average group 
behaviour but to our knowledge there is none so far that uses information on correct 
individual specific average exogenous characteristics. 
3. The data: Nyakatoke, a small village in Tanzania 
The data we will use for our analysis were collected in a village close to Bukoba town, in 
the Kagera region of Tanzania, west of Lake Victoria.  The original tribe living in this area 
are the Haya.  In this region the cooking banana is the main staple food.  Average annual 
consumption per person is between 250 and 350 kg in the Lake Victoria region (Mbwana 
e.a., 1998).  It is not only the most important staple food but also an important source of 
income earning for small subsistence farmers.  However, for some years the productivity 
of the indigenous banana trees has been declining steadily mainly due to increased 
incidence of weevil pests and panama disease and the overall declining productivity of the 
home garden.  The decline in productivity is due to a decline in soil fertility, which in turn 
is principally caused by increased population pressure.  A second reason is the leaching of 
nutrients (or the natural soil depletion).  The productivity problem is most severe in the 
high rainfall zone close to the lake (Baijukya and Folmer, 1999).  There are strong 
differences between the banana yields in the different agro-economic zones of Kagera.  In 
Eastern Kagera (where the survey village is located) the average yield is only 3100 
kilograms per hectare, whereas in Central Kagera it is 6800 and in Western Kagera it is 
even 7500 (ARI Maruku, 1999).  NGOs are active in trying to introduce new kinds of 
bananas that are more resistant to weevils and the panama disease.  The new kinds of 
bananas are proven to give larger bunches of bananas but the farmers are reluctant to adopt 
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these new kinds.  They cling to the old kinds because they claim their taste is better.  We 
do not have exact data on the variance of new banana harvest, where higher variance could 
possibly explain farmers’ reluctance to grow new kinds due to risk aversion.  But we 
assume their variance to be equal to the indigenous banana variance.  Unlike with high 
yielding rice varieties that give much higher output when certain weather and input 
conditions are met, the ideal circumstances to grow new bananas are equal to those of the 
indigenous ones.  No additional inputs or “good” weather are required.  Additional to the 
introduction of new kinds of bananas, NGOs together with farmer extension centres try to 
diffuse techniques that should prevent or mitigate the effects of weevil attacks and the 
panama disease and increase the productivity of the indigenous banana plant. 
The survey was conducted in Nyakatoke, a small village located at 60 kilometres from 
Bukoba, the largest town in the region.  The data set contains information at the household 
as well as the individual level.  Household heads were interviewed on household matters 
and all men and women in the household who earned their own income where interviewed 
separately by an enumerator of the same gender.  At the household level we have 
information on household characteristics such as land ownership, assets, quality of 
housing, food consumption, expenditure and household demographics.  At the individual 
level the information collected contains data on income, harvest, time allocation, transfers 
in kind and in cash, social network members, kinship links, information flows, etc.  
Moreover, we have not taken a sample from the village but the survey includes all 118 
households living in the village.  This is advantageous if we want to analyse social effects.  
We know an individual’s intra-village social links and we have full information on each of 
them. In the remainder of this section we will look at various aspects of information 
linkages in the village. 
Firstly, we will present how farmers perceive the evolution of productivity on their banana 
farm.  In table 3.1 we summarized the answers to the question how the banana harvest of 
2000 was to be compared with the banana harvest of ten years ago.  We find that a 
strikingly high number of the respondents that already grew banana in 1990, claim that 
their banana harvest decreased strongly over the past ten years.  This indicates the depth of 
the problem.  
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Table 3.1: Respondents observation of banana harvest, 2000 versus 1990 
Harvest direction Percentage 
Increased strongly 10 
Increased slightly 13 
Not changed 6 
Decreased slightly 26 
Decreased strongly 45 
Nr. of respondents 78* 
* only 78 households of the 118 mention they grow banana commercially in 2000 and were 
already growing bananas ten years ago.  The reasons may be that the household was not 
formed yet in 1990 or growing banana was not a commercial activity of any of the household 
members at that time. 
Productivity decrease of the banana plant is viewed as one of the major economic problems 
the village faces
5
.  Still, the reaction of the farmers with respect to the adoption of more 
resistant types of bananas or productivity enhancing techniques is limited (cfr.infra).  There 
seems to be some kind of trade-off between taste and fertility decrease.  Farmers prefer the 
indigenous kind of banana but once the fertility of their field is too low they will start 
experimenting with new kinds.  In the villages located closer to the lake border in the high 
rainfall zone of Kagera, the soil is already more depleted and most of the farmers have 
already adopted new kinds of banana.  The strong decrease in productivity however has not 
yet led the farmers to massively experiment with new, more productive kinds of bananas, 
nor to apply productivity enhancing techniques introduced by farmer extension centres (the 
techniques that farmers were asked about in the survey are listed in annex table A.1).  
However limited the reaction of the farmers is, we will devote a separate paragraph both to 
the adoption of new bananas (3.1) and of productivity enhancing techniques (3.2).  In 
paragraph 3.3 we will describe the process of advice seeking behaviour and in the last 
paragraph we will analyse the characteristics of farmers who learn from sources out of the 
village versus those that learn from farmers inside the village.  Moreover, we will analyse 
in depth the intra-village learning or advice links with respect to the relationship between 
farmers and their teachers or advisers. 
                                                 
5
  It is often mentioned as an answer to the following survey question: “Has the situation of the village 
changed compared to ten years ago?  If so, explain.” 
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We are interested in social interactions, i.e. how the behaviour or the exogenous 
characteristics of the social group a farmer is part of influence his individual behaviour.  
Our aim is to define a farmer’s information network.  However, we do not have sufficient 
direct data on it.  Therefore we will use other networks as proxies for the information 
network.  In the following paragraphs we will show that the social networks used (kinship, 
neighbours and social insurance groups) are good proxies for a farmer’s information 
network.  We will focus on three social groups.  In order of exogeneity of the group, we 
will use a farmer’s kinship network, his neighbours and his social insurance network.  A 
household’s kinship network is formed by all other households one of the household 
members has a blood bond with, up to the third degree.  To form a network of neighbours 
we have taken 300 metres as the threshold for the household members of two households 
to be neighbours.  The average distance in the whole village is 523 metres.  The last group 
is a household’s social insurance network.  It includes all the households one of the 
household members mentioned he could rely on in case of need and vice versa.  Obviously, 
the social insurance network is endogenously formed.  Farmers can choose whom to link 
up with and will try to form groups with farmers having certain characteristics, e.g. degree 
of schooling, diversification of income earning activities, productivity, etc. The 
endogeneity of group formation can bias our test results and lead us to conclude that there 
is an endogenous social effect, whereas in reality it is an exogenous social effect.  We do 
not face this problem while using the two exogenous networks, kinship networks and 
neighbours.   
3.1. Adoption of new banana varieties 
Only 22 percent of the households in our survey village grow other than indigenous kinds 
of bananas.  In Nyakatoke, 19 percent of all households grow some of the bananas 
originating from other parts of Tanzania and 4 percent grows Latin American bananas
6
.  
The most important reason for farmers to grow new bananas is not (yet) because of the 
declining productivity of the indigenous banana
7
 but for experimentation in itself (annex 
                                                 
6
  The bananas from other parts of the country were introduced in the Kagera region during the fifties.  
The bananas from Latin America are introduced by KCDP (Kagera Community Development 
Programme) since 1998.   
7
  Only 27% of the farmers that grow bananas from other parts of Tanzania mention the decline in 
productivity as the most important reason and 15% as the second most important reason. 
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table A.2).  Thus the adoption of new kinds of bananas is still in its experimental phase and 
the diffusion process is far from completed.  This makes the process ideal to study.  Most 
of the farmers that grow new bananas started growing them since 1999.  Only very few 
grew new bananas before 1999 (14 percent of the households grew new bananas in 1999, 
five percent in 1998).   
Table 3.2: Household characteristics of adopters of new types of bananas versus non-adopters 
HH characteristics Adopters Non-adopters Significance of 
difference 
Male-headed households 88 % 69 % ** 
Age of household head 44 46  
HH head received some primary 100 % 79 % *** 
HH head completed primary 85 % 52 % *** 
Value of HH durables (in Tsh) 233710 34014 ** 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; x significant at 15% 
 
Table 3.2 shows the characteristics of the households that grow new banana varieties.  88 
percent of the adopting households are male headed, which is significantly higher than the 
percentage male-headed households in the non-adopting category.  All household heads 
who experiment with new banana varieties received some primary education and most of 
them even completed primary education.  The adopting households are significantly better 
educated and wealthier than the non-adopting households.  Thus we find that gender of the 
household head, the level of education and the household wealth strongly influence 
whether a household will adopt new banana varieties. 
Table 3.3 is similar to table 3.2 but instead of describing the individual characteristics of 
adopters versus non-adopters, we present an overview of their average group 
characteristics.  We find that adopters not only live in households where the heads have 
reached significantly higher levels of education, but also belong to social groups where 
household heads on average have higher levels of education.  The difference is most 
significant for having completed primary education in kinship and social insurance 
networks.  For example, in a social insurance network of an adopter of new banana 
varieties, 66% of the household heads have completed primary education, where this is 
only 60% of the household heads in the social insurance networks of a non-adopter.  Also 
the gender effect is present in social insurance and neighbours networks.  So additional to 
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the private effects of education and gender, also intra-group public effects of these 
characteristics exist. 
Table 3.3: Average household characteristics of social groups of adopters versus non-adopters 
Kinship network Neighbours networka Social insurance network Average HH 
characteristics 
of: 
Adopt Non-
adopt. 
Sig. Adopt Non-
adopt. 
Sig. Adopt Non-
adopt. 
Sig. 
Male-headed 
households 
80 % 75 %  76 % 72 % ** 80 % 74 % * 
Age of 
household head 
46  46  45  45  46 47  
Head some 
primary 
90 % 85 % x 86 % 82 % ** 90 % 85 % * 
Primary 
completed  
70 % 57 % ** 62 % 59 %  66 % 60 % ** 
Value of HH 
durables (Tsh) 
78320 93689  103235 75402 * 144100 159894  
a the threshold for being “neighbours” is living at less than 300 metres from each other 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; x significant at 15% 
 
3.2. Use of productivity enhancing techniques 
Additional to cultivating new banana varieties farmers can also apply techniques that 
enhance productivity or try to prevent weevils from attacking the banana plant.  In table 
3.4 we show the percentages of household heads that know and use a certain productivity 
enhancing technique.  Some techniques are very familiar to the farmers and others are new 
and not well known, but in both cases there is a large discrepancy between knowing and 
actually applying the technique.  The mostly mentioned reasons for not applying a certain 
technique were that farmers lack the money to buy the necessary inputs, farmers do not 
believe in the technique or they have only recently learned it and did not start applying it 
yet.  Some answered the techniques were too difficult (annex tables A.3 and A.4).  The 
capital constraint is most pronounced for those techniques where manure or fertiliser is 
used.  Not many farmers own cows or other animals, which makes manure a very scarce 
and relatively expensive input.  Also chemical fertiliser is both an expensive and not 
readily available input.  Where it concerns techniques that do not require expensive inputs, 
farmers often do not believe in the effectiveness of the technique. 
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Table 3.4: Knowledge and use of productivity enhancing techniques*, n=113 
Techniques Knows the technique 
(%) 
Uses the technique (%) 
Special way of digging the hole 61 27 
Applying fertiliser/manure  69 28 
Hot water treatment of the stem before planting 18 3 
Dipping stem in insecticide solution 10 0 
Mulching 1 meter from stem 10 1 
Trench-manure (water conservation) 24 7 
Paring 48 39 
Desuckering (3 plants per stool) 35 19 
Harvest hygiene 35 12 
Weevil trapping 54 22 
*for a more detailed explanation of the techniques, see annex A.1 
Some of the techniques were already known by the farmers when they started their farm 
because they saw their parents practising it.  Other techniques are very new ones only 
recently introduced by extension agents because of the urgent need to prevent the banana 
trees from deteriorating any further.  In table 3.5 we present a summary of how the 
technology is diffused.  Broadly, there are two steps.  In the first step information enters 
the village from outside whether it is from farmers living in another village or via contact 
with farmer extension workers.  The first step has a large positive externality: in the second 
step information on techniques is diffused amongst other farmers in the village.   
Table 3.5: Learning and diffusion of techniques 
Source % of techniques  
learned from source 
% of known 
techniques used 
Information enters village via:   
Farmers outside community 6 (22)* 55 
Formal extension (NGO/government/seminars) 48 (189) 47 
Other (Self-taught, school) 3 (7) 50 
Diffused further via:   
Farmers inside community 38 (150) 43 
No specifically identifiable person 7 (29) 32 
All techniques learned 100  (397) 44 
* number of times answered between brackets 
 20
48 percent of all techniques learned by farmers were taught by an extension officer.  
Another 38 percent of the techniques that farmers know are learned from other farmers 
living in the same village.  7 percent is learned from farmers inside the village but who can 
not be clearly specified.  They may be dead relatives or a group of farmers.  We notice that 
a higher percentage of the techniques that farmers know is actually applied when farmers 
have learned it from an outside source.  Clearly, this is a self-selection problem.  Farmers 
that learn techniques from outside the village have chosen to put some effort into looking 
for solutions to their agricultural problems and to undertake transaction costs to learn the 
technique with the specific aim of applying it.  Whereas farmers who learned techniques 
from other farmers in the village, may well have accidentally learned it while visiting each 
other or discussing agricultural issues.  With respect to these intra-village learning links, 
we are interested in whether they are determined by the relationship between both farmers.  
In table 3.6 we present some information on learning clusters.     
Table 3.6: Learning links and social groups 
Percentage of households of the same social group if Social groups based on 
one has learned 
techniques 
no learning link Significance 
Kinship 45  5  *** 
Clan 38  9  *** 
Religion 60  35 *** 
Distance (metres) 249  522 *** 
Insurance group 55 7 *** 
Observations (nr) 40 14002  
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; x significant at 15% 
Table 3.6 shows that the households one learns from are significantly more of the same 
social group than those one does not have a learning link with.  45 percent of the farmers 
one has learned techniques from, belong to kin-related households.  Of all the households 
one does not learn from, only five percent are kin-related (which is the average percentage 
of kin-related households in the village).  Consequently, we assume that any of these social 
groups, on each of which we have full information for all respondents, can serve as a proxy 
for farmers’ actual learning networks (for which we do not have data for all respondents, 
since the question on techniques learned was only answered by household heads who knew 
the technique).  The importance of social groups is also shown by the regressions in annex 
(table A.5).  The left hand sided variable is one if two households have a learning link and 
zero otherwise.  We used relational variables to explain the link, such as whether both 
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household heads received lower primary education or whether a kinship or a social 
insurance link exists.  Apparently, whether the household heads are of the same gender 
weakly affects the possibility that a learning link exists, but whether both households are 
kin-related, belong to the same social insurance network or live closer together are far 
more significant explanatory variables, which confirms the descriptive statistics in table 
3.6. 
3.3. Advice seeking behaviour 
Another question asked in the survey was how many times farmers go to others for advice 
on agricultural issues.  We listed some ten different types of persons, such as the 
community leader, the innovator of the village, the individual’s two most important social 
insurance members, the extension officer, etc.  We do not claim we have captured all 
possible advice sources but they can serve as an indication of the importance of different 
advice sources.  In table 3.7 we show the relative percentages of certain types of persons 
whom farmers asked for advice in the year 2000.  For social insurance network members 
we only inquired about the two most important members.  Asking for all of them would 
have been very time consuming.  Moreover, if any bias exists, it will be an underestimation 
of the true advice source a whole social insurance network constitutes.  So the weight of 
the social insurance network capturing only the two most important members versus other 
persons asked will underestimate rather than overestimate the true weight of social network 
members as advice sources.  “Typical advisers” are the farmers mentioned by the 
respondent as an answer to another question, which was “whom would you go to for 
advice if there was a problem with your crops”.  The innovator of the village is the farmer 
that experiments the most with new crops
8
.  The random persons are drawn from all the 
villagers that earn an own income.  They are included to check for significant differences 
between just any farmer of the village and specific farmers that are part of a person’s 
information network.  They serve as a comparison to the other types of persons.   
                                                 
8
  The “innovator of the village” was chosen by the enumerators on the basis of how many different kinds 
of new crops a farmer cultivates, on the magnitude of the area he allocates to them, when he started 
growing new crops and on how well they grow.  It did not require long discussions before we were able 
to choose the innovator. 
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Table 3.7: Importance of agricultural advice by source, in 2000 
% of all advice asked by gender Source % of all advice 
asked * women men 
Extension officer 10 9 11 
Insurance network members 20 16 23 
Typical adviser (female) 9 19 1 
Typical adviser (male) 21 17 25 
Innovator of the village 20 11 29 
Random person (female) 0 0 0 
Random person (male) 4 7 2 
*the percentages do not add up to 100 because there are other sources, not presented in the table 
20 percent of the times farmers seek advice about agricultural issues, they go to their social 
insurance network members.  For both men and women their social insurance network 
members seem to be very important advice sources, at least from those listed.  Men have 
more contact with the village innovator, most probably since the latter person is also a 
man.  Social insurance network members and typical advisers are far more important than 
the role extension officers play in the advice seeking behaviour of the farmers (10%).  
Probably we find this result due to the cost attached to advice seeking and the type of 
advice one is looking for.  Visiting a farmer extension worker, who does not reside in the 
village, at least has a time cost that is larger than the cost of going to another villager.  
Moreover, if the problem is a rather small one, one will prefer to go to a friend from the 
village and talk it over while visiting one another.  But if one really has a severe problem 
an extension officer may be perceived to know better what is appropriate to do.  We can 
conclude that the high percentages of advice asked from insurance network members are 
not just co-incidence since the percentage of advice farmers asked a randomly drawn 
person from the village is close to zero.  It shows that the assumption that a whole village 
constitutes one information network is untrue, at least in our case.  Random villagers are 
hardly asked for advice
9
.  Information will not simply enter the village and be spread to all 
farmers but it flows via networks (most likely overlapping with other networks).  The table 
supports the idea that the social insurance network is a good proxy for a farmer’s intra-
village agricultural information network.  
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So far we only discussed actual information links, learning or advice links as they actually 
took place.  The survey also contained questions on hypothetical advice links.  The farmers 
were asked “whom they would go to for advice if something went wrong with their crops” 
(cfr. typical adviser).  We analysed these answers with respect to social groups the 
hypothetical advisers belonged to (table 3.8).  More or less the same picture emerges as 
what we found for actual learning links.  Of all the farmers mentioned as hypothetical 
advice sources, 38 percent belong to kin-related households, which is significantly more 
than the average percentage kin-related households if no hypothetical advice links exist.  In 
annex (table A.6) we find these descriptive statistics strongly confirmed by the regression 
results.  The group dummies (farmers belong to kinship related households, distance 
between households, farmers belong to households in the same social insurance network) 
significantly affect the probability of a hypothetical advice link between two respondents.  
Being of the same gender has a strong positive effect on the probability of advice links.  
The gender effect indicates that women consult other women and men consult men.  If 
both farmers received lower primary education the probability that they mention each other 
as an adviser is significantly lower than if only one of both would have reached this level 
of education or none of them did.  Further, table A.6 shows that being part of the same 
household also increases the probability of there being an (ex ante) advice link.  Thus 
farmers will consult other farmers in the household.  This may point to the existence of 
intra-household information flows
10
. 
Table 3.8: Hypothetical information links and social groups 
Percentage of households of the same social group if Social groups based on 
one would go for 
advice to 
no advice link Significance 
Kinship 38 5  *** 
Clan 26 9  *** 
Religion 50 35 *** 
Distance (metres) 295 523 *** 
Insurance group 76 7 *** 
Observations (nr) 74 13968  
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; x significant at 15% 
                                                                                                                                                    
9
  The sample probability that there is an hypothetical (ex ante) advice link between two villagers is close 
to zero percent (0.159%). 
10
  Mostly the direction is from women asking their husbands for advice and not the other way around. 
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In the remainder of the section we will compare the determinants of intra-village learning 
and advice links versus outside information sources. 
3.4. Outside versus inside sources of learning/advice seeking 
In annex figure A.7 we show how all farmers in the village are connected to their typical 
adviser, the person or persons they would go to for advice if anything went wrong with 
their crops.  Each line represents a link between a farmer and any of his advice sources.  
The figure in annex A.8 represents households whose head knows about at least one of the 
banana productivity enhancing techniques linked to whom he learned it from.  The 
difference between both graphs is that the fist graph does not represent what farmers 
actually do but what they say they would do in case of a serious problem
11
 whereas the 
second graph represents what actually happened.  The two graphs differ substantially in the 
number of layers they consist of and the denseness of the layers.  Included in the first layer 
(lowest in the graph) are those farmers that pull information into the village.  The upper 
layers include farmers who receive their information from these villagers who have sought 
information outside of the village.   
With respect to hypothetical advice seeking (A.7), many farmers in the survey are included 
in the first layer.  They would go to an extension officer or to outside farmers.  The layers 
of intra-village hypothetical advice links are rather thin.  There are a number of farmers 
who are many steps away from an outside advice source (maximum five layers in A.7).  In 
annex (table A.9) we present probit regressions to look deeper into what determines 
whether a farmer mentions ex ante he would consult an outside source in case of a severe 
agricultural problem.  The regressions mainly reveal that gender and higher education 
strongly increase the possibility that the farmer mentions an outside advice source.  Men 
have a nearly 50 percent higher probability of contacting an extension officer.  Some 
primary education has a slightly positive effect but some secondary education has a large 
and significant effect on the ex ante probability of seeking advice from an extension 
officer.   
                                                 
11
  These are the “opinion leaders” in Rogers (1995).  Opinion leaders can be identified by the sociometric 
method, which entails exactly the same question as was used in our survey (whom would you –actually 
or hypothetically- go to for advice or information) 
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The second graph is a representation of what actually happened.  We asked farmers who 
learned a productivity enhancing technique from another farmer inside the village, who 
that farmer was.  There are a lot of farmers who have learned some of the techniques they 
know from outside sources.  The graph gives a good view of the flow of information 
entering and spreading through the village.  We observe that a lot of farmers get their 
information from outside the village be it from extension workers or from friends and 
relatives living in other villages
12
.  Then there is a second layer of farmers inside the 
village tapping information from those that have collected it from outside the village.  
Unlike in graph A.7 most farmers in the village, who have learned techniques, are linked 
either directly either indirectly via one other farmer, to an outside learning source.  Also 
for learning new techniques we ran a probit regression (table A.10) to explain which types 
of farmers belong to the first layer in the information diffusion process.  What is very 
prominent from the regressions on actual behaviour is the insignificance of the gender of 
the household head contrary to what we found for the ex ante regressions.  Some primary 
education is of weakly significant positive influence to having learned techniques from 
someone outside the village and completing primary education increases the probability of 
learning from an extension officer.  The amount of land is the most significantly positively 
correlated factor with the probability of having learned techniques from outside the village 
sources, meaning it is the largest farmers that usually bring information into the village.    
3.5. Conclusion 
From the descriptive tables we can conclude that there is a lot of information being 
transferred between the farmers of a village.  We have presented evidence to support our 
hypothesis that the identified social groups (kinship groups, neighbours and social 
insurance network members) are good proxies for a farmer’s agricultural information 
network
13
.  Therefore they may be used to perform the agricultural social interactions test 
we proposed.   
                                                 
12
  In the case of whom techniques are learned from, the “outside relatives” option sometimes includes 
relatives who are already dead such as parents or grandparents. 
13
  “Individuals tend to be linked [in information networks] with others who are close to them in spatial 
and social distance”, (Rogers, 1995,p.311) which is very close to the results found in De Weerdt, 2002.  
He finds that physical distance is very important in determining whether two individuals have a social 
insurance link.  Moreover religion and education are significantly more the same in a social insurance 
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Mostly a one-directional relationship exists.  There are some key group members who are 
asked for advice but who get their advice from outside the group or the village.  Our results 
show important externalities of information diffusion within social groups.  Possibly, we 
will have to take that observation into account in our test.  The test might not hold for all 
farmers in the same way.  For example, the highest productive farmers in a group may 
prefer to seek information outside their group.  Also those farmers who have outside 
information sources might not learn from group members.  If our social interactions test 
proves positive, an organisation that aims to inform farmers, would not have to contact or 
include all the farmers in the programme, but the social multiplier effect will make sure the 
information spills over to other farmers that are part of the same network.  If only those 
interested are informed, information will be diffused to other members of the social groups 
that farmer belongs to.   
But the remaining question is whether the existence of information flows between farmers 
implies that their outcomes are related.  Therefore, in the next section we will analyse the 
relation between the average behaviour of the social group a farmer is part of and his own 
behaviour (in terms of the production of bananas).  If endogenous social effects would 
exist within some of the groups defined, we can conclude that the adoption of productivity 
enhancing techniques does not only affect the output of the adopting farmers.  But whether 
or not the relation between outcomes can be attributed to technique diffusion and learning 
is yet another question. 
                                                                                                                                                    
network compared to random clusters drawn from the village.  We may safely assume that the social 
insurance and the communication network significantly overlap. 
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4. Empirical results 
The main part of this section will be the social interactions test.  Though first, we will 
briefly summarize the conclusions from the theoretical and the descriptive parts.  Next, we 
will present the form of the test and describe the variables used.  For the test we will first 
assume exogenous social effects to be non-existent and afterwards allowing individual 
output to vary with exogenous group characteristics.  It will clearly show the limitations to 
the conclusions we can draw from the first test.  With respect to the observations included 
in the analysis, we will take into account some of the evidence shown from section three.  
It became clear that there are differences between the farmers regarding their information 
behaviour.  While some pull information inside the village, others tap their information 
from other farmers inside the village.  This behaviour may affect the direction of the 
possible externalities on individual outcome.  Therefore we will correct for the relative 
productivity position of a farmer within his social group.  Subsequently we checked the 
robustness of our results.  To correct for the possibility that outcomes of all farmers in the 
village simply move in the same direction we will randomly allocate a set of characteristics 
and productivities to a farmer’s social group members.  Via bootstrapping we will obtain 
an estimate of whether the coefficient of the true group members’ characteristics is 
significantly higher.  Lastly, we will focus on how average group behaviour directly affects 
individual behaviour, in terms of knowing or using certain techniques, additional to our 
analysis of indirect effects via banana outcomes. 
In the theoretical section we showed how farmers update their beliefs on the expected 
benefits of applying a certain technique, based on the experience of other farmers.  Farmers 
update their beliefs based on outcomes of other farmers or on information provided by 
other farmers.  We also showed how the updating mechanism may be dependent on the 
relationship between farmers.  A farmer attaches more weight to information received from 
“group members” than information received from just any farmer in the village.   
In section three we found evidence that information on techniques or advice on agricultural 
issues flows via certain linkages indeed and does not seem to reach all farmers of the 
village in the same way.  What is apparent from the data is the fact that a farmer’s advice 
seeking and learning behaviour is strongly dependent on the relationship he has with the 
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informative farmer.  Farmers who are part of the same social group visit and talk to each 
frequently
14
, thereby providing opportunities to observe closely the proceedings on the 
other’s field and to inform one another on production technologies used.  So if a member 
of a farmer’s agricultural information network, which we will proxy by three types of 
social networks, achieves good results by using a certain technique, he can explain this 
technique exactly.  Afterwards the other farmer can decide to apply it himself.  If this is 
really how the process works, we can assume that improved productivity results on the 
farm of one of the members of farmer i’s social group has positive effects on the outcome 
of farmer i.  Consequently, outcome is an indirect measure of farmers’ behaviour.  Since 
we have full data on all the members of a farmer’s kinship, neighbours and social 
insurance group members, who are living inside the village, we can test our hypothesis of 
social interaction. 
We will start by testing the pure endogenous effects model, using a log-linearized Cobb-
Douglas production function:  
 ttiiiti uPXZY ++++= −− )log()log()log()log( 1,, δχβα  (4.1) 
)( ,tiYLog  is the logarithm of the value of the banana harvest of farmer i at time t (measured 
in Tanzanian Shilling).   is a vector with characteristics of the household farmer i 
belongs to.  We will include the number of hectares cultivated with banana trees.  It is 
mostly the whole area of the plot around the house
iZ
15
 (kibanja), which is the most fertile and 
most closely located of all plots.  Other than banana trees, the kibanja is also cultivated 
with coffee, maize and beans, all intercropped.  We take the area of the kibanja as 
exogenous.  There is a very strong case to do so because the area where the survey was 
done is characterised by a high population density.  The house with the kibanja area around 
it is mostly constructed at marriage and the land is part of the husbands’ family land.  
There is not much opportunity to expand the kibanja area since neighbours’ kibanjas are 
                                                 
14
  Sometimes a farmer’s social network does include persons who live further away and who hardly ever 
meet each other but for the analysis we only included those network members living in the same village. 
15
  Called the kibanja in Swahili, see Mitti and Rweyemamu (2001), p.15; Baijukya and Folmer (1999), 
p.45 for characteristics of the kibanja and other plot types and the type of crops grown on different plot 
types. 
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next to it
16
.  Some households do grow banana trees on less fertile grounds but mostly the 
banana area is restricted to the kibanja area, which is in principle not expandable.  
Moreover, the banana plant is a quasi-permanent crop.  It takes up to one year for the first 
flowering of the mother plant.  The mother spontaneously produces a daughter and a 
granddaughter and then dies.  The banana field is easily maintained and the farmer even 
has to remove excess suckers.  Hence the kibanja area is not a choice variable.  We do not 
have individual information on the hectares cultivated with bananas.  This information 
would be nearly impossible to collect since husband and wife often care for all the banana 
trees in the kibanja at the same time.  When the men are mulching the kibanja they will 
mulch the whole plot and not just their own banana trees.  When women are weeding their 
beans, which grow under the banana trees, they are in fact also weeding the banana field.  
Men and women’s banana trees are scattered all over the plot and often it is only the 
marketing of the crops that is done separately.  Men are often responsible for the marketing 
of the beer bananas and women for marketing of the cooking bananas.  But nothing 
prevents men to sell cooking or women to sell beer bananas.  Another household 
characteristic we will use as a regressor is the number of adults present to capture labour 
availability.   is a vector including individual characteristics of farmer i, such as gender 
and age of the banana grower
iX
17
.  The education level of farmer i will be represented by two 
dummy variables indicating whether the banana grower has gone through lower primary 
school
18
 or completed primary school (cumulatively).  The logarithm is taken of all the 
continuous variables in the regression and dummies remain in the regression as levels.   
)( 1, −− tiPLog  is the logarithm of the average banana productivity at time t-1, of the 
households that are part of farmer i’s social group, excluding the productivity of farmer i 
himself.  We use the average productivity of the households that are linked to the 
household farmer i is part of.  Therefore we have to make the assumption of intra-
household information pooling: we assume that, if any household member receives 
                                                 
16
  A special type of plants marks the borders of the kibanjas, otherwise it would look like one very large 
banana field.  
 
17
  Often the household head and his spouse are jointly responsible for the banana trees although they do 
sell separately.   
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information on banana cultivation from his social network, he will share this information 
with his fellow banana growing household members.  Since we assume the process of 
diffusion of techniques has not reached an equilibrium situation yet, our data allow us to 
solve the reflection problem described in Manski (1999) by including lagged productivity 
and by excluding the individual from the average group behaviour.  This is an important 
advantage of the data, which were collected with the specific aim to identify social groups 
within the village, a feature which most other datasets lack.  If 0≠δ , we can conclude that 
social effects exist. 
Xlog(
The social effect can be (partly) caused by exogenous characteristics of the whole group 
that drive productivity.  Moreover, in the case of endogenously formed groups such as the 
social insurance network, the coefficients will be correlated across the network members 
due to self-selection.  Hence, we will allow for exogenous social effects in the next set of 
regressions:   
 titiiiti uPXZY +++++= −−− ))log()log()log()log( 1,, εδχβα  (4.2) 
where iX −  is a vector of average group characteristics, such as age composition of the 
group and the average level of education within the group.  If 0≠δ  there are true 
endogenous social effects.  If 0≠ε , exogenous social effects exist. 
Averages of the variables used in the regressions are presented in table 4.1.  Of all the 
individuals in the village who grow bananas, 81 percent mentioned selling bananas as an 
income earning activity.  For them, we have information on total harvest value, both what 
was sold and what was consumed by the household.  But unfortunately we do not have 
information on consumed harvest values for those households that did not mention banana 
cultivation as a source of cash income.  The reason is that the survey aimed to capture only 
the income earning activities individuals where engaged in and no information was 
gathered on harvest values of those crops grown only for household consumption.  
Although at least one person in each household grows bananas some observations could 
not be used due to the formulation of the question and missing harvest values.  Thus we 
                                                                                                                                                    
18
  Lower primary school is from first to fourth grade of primary school.  Higher primary is from grade five 
to seven. 
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will use a two-step Heckman selection model to correct for the sample selection problem.  
We will include a first step where an individual has to decide whether to sell bananas or 
not.  As first-step selection variables we will use the number of children present in the 
household and the value of the household durables, which might influence the decision to 
sell bananas but not the productivity of the banana grower.   
To value the harvest, we used prices of 2000 for both years
19
, in order to avoid price effects 
and to capture pure productivity effects.  The average output of banana selling individuals 
was much higher in 2000 than it was in 1999.  The reasons for this increase we can only 
guess.  Possibly, there are more trees on the field or more cooking banana trees relative to 
beer bananas (the latter are much cheaper).  
Regarding some characteristics of the banana growers, we see that the gender ratio is fairly 
equal.  As many women as men grow bananas.  79 percent reached the fourth year of 
primary school whereas only 57 percent completed primary school.  Household land is on 
average 1,3 hectares, half of which is cultivated with bananas.  With respect to social 
groups, there are some households that do not have any kin related households in the 
village.  The number of kin-related households who also sell bananas is around five.  The 
number in the social insurance group is somewhat higher.  Neighbours form the largest 
group.  Obviously 300 metres is an arbitrary measure.  We chose it because on the one 
hand, it is below the average distance in the village (523 metres).  On the other hand if we 
were to opt for a lower threshold many observations would be dropped from our analysis.   
                                                 
19
  To value the harvest of 1999, we used the average price of a bunch of bananas in 2000 (average of five 
rounds). 
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 Table 4.1: Description of regression variables 
Variables* Obs Average Min Max 
Banana sellers in 2000 (% of banana growers) 117 81 0 1 
Banana sellers in 1999 (% of banana growers) 117 67 0 1 
Average price of a bunch of cooking bananas  5 1140 1000 1500 
Average price of a bunch of beer bananas 5 330 250 400 
Output value in 2000 (in 2000 Tsh) 95 6841 71 47878 
Output value in 1999 (in 2000 Tsh-average) 81 3351 55 31350 
Of all banana growers (95):     
Male growers (%) 95 52 0 1 
Age 95 44 20 89 
Some primary education (% reached standard 1 to 4) 95 79 0 1 
Completed primary education (% standard 5 to 7) 95 57 0 1 
Of all households with at least one banana grower (81):     
Kibanja (hectare) 81 0.6 0.03 2.0 
Land (hectare) 78 1.3 0.08 8.3 
Fertility of the kibanja higher than average (%) 81 19 0 1 
Durables (value in Tsh)** 81 90146 400 4357500 
Adults present in the household (> 15 years) 81 3 1 8 
Children present in the household (<= 15 years) 81 2 0 7 
Social groups (average nr of persons in group):     
Kinship members 88 8 1 20 
Banana selling kinship members 1999 88 5 1 13 
Neighbours (living at less than 300 metres) 95 32 7 54 
Banana selling neighbours 1999 95 21 3 34 
Social insurance network members 95 10 1 32 
Banana selling social insurance network members 1999 95 7 1 25 
*values are expressed in Tanzanian Shilling (1 US$=+/-800Tsh) 
**in the regressions we used an index of durables rather than the value of the household durables 
 
Tables 4.2a and 4.2b are organised as follows.  Table 4.2a gives the Cobb-Douglas 
estimation results for the case where exogenous social effects are assumed to be non-
existent.  The first three columns show the results for all farmers in the village, the last 
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three give the results when we exclude the two relatively most productive farmers in each 
group (the intermediate case when only the first most productive farmers are excluded is 
presented in annex).  We exclude the two most productive farmers in the group
20
 because 
they will be teachers or advisers rather than learners.  This assumption is confirmed by our 
data.  In annex table A.11 we find that in the group of the 25 percent most productive 
farmers there are significantly more agricultural advisers and technique teachers than in the 
lowest productive groups.  Including them in the regressions would underestimate any 
social effects.  This is only possible due to the nature of our data.  Since we know the exact 
group composition and have information on productivity of all members we are able to 
exclude those most productive farmers.  Consequently we can grasp more details of the 
process.  In table 4.2b we relax the assumption of zero coefficients for the exogenous 
effects and allow them to exist.  We will use three types of social groups.  In order of 
exogeneity of group formation these are kinship related groups (completely exogenous), 
neighbours
21
 (relatively exogenous) and social insurance groups (endogenously formed).   
Without including any social effects (Annex table A.12) the most significant determinants 
of banana output value are the magnitude of the kibanja (significant at one percent), the 
number of adults (significant at ten percent) and having received some primary education 
(significant at five percent).  In the selection, an individual’s age and available household 
labour influence participation positively, whereas the wealth of the household has a 
negative effect on the probability of selling bananas.  From the regressions in tables 4.2a 
and 4.2b we find that the positive effects of having a larger kibanja, more adults present in 
the household and having received some primary education are consistent throughout all 
the regression specifications.   
The private effects of having a larger kibanja, higher availability of labour and having run 
through the first four years of primary school have more or less the same effects and 
                                                 
20
  Note that the most productive farmers excluded from the group are therefore not the same as the 
farmers in the first layer of technique learners.  We exclude the two most productive farmers since 
farmers learn from and go for advice to the most productive farmers in their group.  The relative 
productivity position in the reference group was taken from the banana productivity in 1999 (often this 
position was the same in 2000). 
21
  Living at less than 300 metres from each other.  Neighbours are fairly exogenous since the plot of land 
where the house is built is mostly inherited from father to sons. 
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significance in all model specifications.  The social effects however, are quite different 
depending on both the group and the model we analyse.   
In the pure endogenous model (4.2a) for all farmers in the group included we find social 
effects within social insurance groups but not in kinship related groups or neighbours.  We 
have tried out several thresholds of being neighbours, between 50 and 1000 metres, but in 
none of these we found social effects.  When we exclude the most productive farmers in 
each group (annex A.13a) the coefficients of kinship groups and social insurance groups 
become larger.  Finally, when we exclude the two most productive farmers, we find 
significant social effects for kinship related and social insurance groups.  So we do find 
evidence to support our hypothesis that there is a direction to the social effects going from 
the more productive to the less productive group members.   
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Table 4.2a: Heckman two-step estimatesa for social interactions, respective social groups 
All farmers included Two most productive farmers per group excluded 
(1) Kinship (2) Neighbours 
<300m 
(3) Social Insurance (4) Kinship (5) Neighbours 
<300m 
(6) Social Insurance 
Dep. Variable: 
Log(banana value) 
Coeff.            Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif.
Log(kibanja)             0.730 *** 0.727 *** 0.611 *** 0.621 ** 0.681 *** 0.618 ***
Log(adults)             0.673 x 0.662 * 0.890 ** 1.279 * 0.532 * 0.977 *
Male grower             -0.245 -0.365 -0.368 0.162 -0.300 -0.092
Some primary educ.             0.869 ** 0.958 ** 1.066 *** 0.913 x 0.914 ** 1.085 **
Completed primary             -0.070 -0.215 -0.185 0.333 -0.264 -0.145
Log(age)             0.288 0.227 0.363 0.998 0.087 0.426
Group averages:             
Log(productivity t-1)              0.178 -0.486 0.344 ** 0.603 * -0.380 0.456 *
Constant             4.845 x 11.069 2.617 -3.328 10.788 ** 0.828
Mills lambda             -0.013 0.013 0.416 1.421 -0.307 1.129
Observations             108 114 116 79 107 97
Uncensored obs.              87 95 95 58 88 76
Wald chi²             38.22 37.71 38.32 28.37 29.32 29.78
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; x significant at 15% 
a selection effects not shown in the table 
Table 4.2b: Heckman two-step estimatesa for endogenous versus exogenous social interactions, respective social groups 
All farmers included Two most productive farmers per group excluded 
(1) Kinship (2) Neighbours 
<300m 
(3) Social Insurance (4) Kinship (5) Neighbours 
<300m 
(6) Social Insurance 
Dep. Variable: 
Log(banana value) 
Coeff.            Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif.
Log(kibanja)             0.789 *** 0.676 *** 0.586 *** 0.643 ** 0.581 *** 0.567 **
Log(adults)             0.630 x 0.863 ** 0.936 *** 1.141 * 0.760 * 0.681 *
Male grower             -0.265 -0.316 -0.357 0.017 -202 -0.099
Some primary educ.             0.923 ** 1.034 ** 1.038 ** 1.094 * 0.965 ** 0.909 *
Completed primary             -0.158 -0.355 -0.158 0.088 -0.343 -0.156
Log(age)             0.210 0.203 0.409 0.771 0.061 0.179
Group averages:             
Log(productivity t-1)              0.151 -0.582 0.297 0.536 * -0.774 0.272
Head some primary             0.620 -1.171 0.531 0.093 -1.803 1.591
Head completed prim             -2.037 * 2.595 * -0.033 -1.864 2.753 * -1.569
Log(age head)             -1.997 * -1.772 0.172 -0.947 -3.209 -0.071
Constant             13.734 ** 18.074 x 1.706 3.035 26.245 ** 3.822
Mills lambda             -0.022 0.007 0.519 1.225 -0.212 0.418
Observations             108 114 116 79 107 97
Uncensored obs.              87 95 95 58 88 76
Wald chi²             52.78 44.85 48.72 34.12 37.76 38.88
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; x significant at 15% 
a selection effects not shown in the table 
Thus we find evidence that social capital truly is capital in the sense that it contributes to 
productivity (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999).  Although we can conclude from table 4.2a that 
there are social effects within kinship and insurance related groups we can not yet draw 
any conclusions on the social multiplier effect (or the existence of endogenous social 
effects).  It may well be that outcomes of the farmers in a group are related simply because 
they have the same exogenous characteristics.  Especially in endogenously formed groups 
such as social insurance groups, the probability exists that the groups are formed on the 
basis of agricultural productivity of the members or on other factors that also drive 
productivity such as education.  Therefore, instead of an endogenous social effect, it may 
be that all members have the same exogenous characteristics that drive group formation 
and productivity at the same time.   
To correct for this, we include exogenous average group characteristics (the individual’s 
characteristics again excluded from his group average), such as the percentage of 
household heads of the group members having received lower primary and higher primary 
education and the average age of the household heads.  From table 4.2b we find that there 
are no endogenous social effects in any of our groups when we include all farmers in the 
group.  Once we allow for a directional relationship between members of a social group 
and we drop the two most productive farmers from the group, we obtain the following 
results.  Column four in table 4.2b shows that endogenous social effects exist within kin 
related groups.  From column five we find that there are positive effects of neighbours’ 
education on individual outcome.  Apparently, there are public effects of higher primary 
education between neighbours.  This effect is comparable to the positive intra-household 
externality of a literate household member described in Basu and Foster (1998).  It is 
striking that once corrected for exogenous characteristics (though they do not seem 
significant) the social effect within insurance groups disappears.  So it is indeed the 
exogenous characteristics that drive group formation appear to affect productivity too.  
When we do not correct for exogenous characteristics the social effect in this type of 
groups appears misleadingly large. 
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As a robustness test
22
 we bootstrapped the results to correct for a possible positive trend in 
the village affecting all farmers in the same way. The question was whether the relation 
between lagged group member’s productivity and own harvest value only holds for kinship 
and social insurance group members. Possibly the relation also exists if we were to include 
randomly chosen lagged group productivity averages. We constructed the test as follows.  
In the file with household characteristics (and lagged productivity) we randomized the 
household numbers. After linking this file to the file containing the individuals and all their 
kinship, neighbour and social insurance households, these households have now randomly 
attributed characteristics and lagged productivity. Thus it will produce random lagged 
average group productivities for the Heckman regressions explaining individual banana 
harvest values. In figures 4.3a, 4.3b and 4.3c we find the results of 1000 random matches 
for kinship, neighbours and social insurance groups respectively. The bootstrap test 
confirms our results. For kinship and social insurance groups with randomly attributed 
characteristics, the coefficient of lagged average group productivity was lower than the 
coefficient with group members’ true characteristics in at least 90 percent of the drawings.  
To summarize the results of the regressions, we found that there are endogenous social 
effects between kinship related farmers but they work from the more to the less productive 
members. Thus kinship members only learn from their most productive family members.  
With respect to neighbours, we do not find any endogenous social effects but there are 
exogenous social effects of higher primary education.  So additional to the private effects 
of lower primary education there seem to be public effects of higher primary education.  So 
farmers living in neighbourhoods with a relatively high concentration of households with a  
                                                 
22
  Another robustness check we performed was a fixed effects estimation to correct for farmer 
heterogeneity by using the panel nature of our data.  In 2000 harvest was reported three times, once for 
the first six months, then every three months and retrospectively for 1999.  In the fixed effects 
regressions we included the number of adults present in the household and the average group 
productivity at t-1.  These are the only variables that change over time.  Though we have to remark that 
the number of households where adults present changed was only marginal.  We ran an Ordinary Least 
Squares regression instead of using the Heckman selection model.  We assume the OLS coefficients to 
be consistent estimates since the coefficient on Mills lambda proved insignificant so there is no 
selection problem.  In the fixed effects regressions we find positive but insignificant coefficients for 
lagged group productivity in all three groups.  This may be due to the fact that the lags are rather short 
in order to measure any improved productivity effects in growing bananas.  Banana plants need 
approximately one year before they are fully grown, so three or six months lags are not the appropriate 
period for measuring learning effects.  What we measure by the change in outcome might simply be an 
approximation of the measurement error and not the change in output.  Brock and Durlauf (2001) also 
suggest that enough variation in the change in average behaviour is useful for identification.  In slowly 
moving environments, the coefficient of the change in average behaviour may be difficult to estimate 
precisely. 
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head who completed primary education, obtain higher outcomes. With respect to social 
effects within insurance groups we can conclude the following.  Since these groups are 
endogenously formed productive farmers may try to link up with other farmers of more or 
less the same productivity (driven by exogenous characteristics common to all farmers in 
the group, which have determined the group formation).  Therefore, in first instance a 
social effect appeared to exist.  However, this effect disappeared as soon as we corrected 
for exogenous characteristics.   
Figure 4.3a: Bootstrap results for kinship groups 
nr
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Figure 4.3b: Bootstrap results for neighbour groups 
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 Figure 4.3c: Bootstrap results for social insurance groups 
nr
 regcoef  bootcoef
1 1000
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A question that remains is why the endogenous social effects that generate the social 
multiplier only seem to exist in kinship related groups.  Possibly the answer lies in the fact 
that, before one can gain from another farmer’s knowledge, information about the 
production technology has to be passed on very meticulously (the variance of the noise in 
transmitting information is small).  Simply observing what happens on another farm is not 
sufficient, but farmers need to know the exact way of how the good result was obtained.  
Presumably kinship related farmers, e.g. parents and siblings take more time to explain the 
production technology, than would neighbours or social insurance network members do.   
To analyse this hypothesis a bit further, we will look into the direct individual behavioural 
effects of group members’ average behaviour.  More specifically, we will analyse whether 
the average behaviour of the reference group with respect to using techniques or seeking 
advice positively affects an individual farmers’ technique using behaviour or outcome 
respectively.  In table 4.4 we show the results of the probit regressions explaining whether 
the household head uses (at least one of the) productivity enhancing techniques.  In the 
next table (4.5) we include the average group advice seeking behaviour as an explanatory 
variable for the banana harvest value.  Unlike in table 4.2 we use simple ordinary least 
squares for the regressions because from 4.2 we found that there was no selection bias. 
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The regressions in table 4.4 show how the number of techniques used by farmers in a 
certain social group affects an individual group member’s use of at least one of the 
techniques available.  The questions on use of techniques were only asked at household 
level, so it is mostly the household head who responded.  Other than technique use in the 
group we included the same household and individual variables as in the previous 
regressions.  At the household level we found that the size of the farm is a significantly 
positive determinant to the using techniques.  Education effects only exist for farmers who 
completed primary school.  Apparently there is some education threshold at more than four 
years of schooling for education to have an impact on a farmer’s decision to use 
productivity enhancing techniques.  Supportive to our hypothesis that family members 
transmit information better, we find the effect of the number of techniques used by group 
members to be positive and significant only for kinship related groups.  What we find is a 
pure endogenous social effect since we corrected for exogenous group characteristics. 
Further, we analysed the effects of information obtained by group members on the 
production value of an individual farmer (4.5).  For information we used first the number 
of group members having an out-of-village advice source.  Alternatively, we used the 
frequency of group members consulting an extension officer in period t-1.  The regressions 
are similar to those in table 4.2, except that we replaced lagged average group productivity 
by the information obtained within a social group in order to capture the effects of 
information spreading explicitly.  We ran the regression for all farmers (without excluding 
the most productive ones). 
With respect to individual and household level variables the effects are consistent with the 
results shown in table 4.2.  Regarding the advice seeking behaviour of the group, we find 
that for all three groups endogenous social effects exist: the more group members have an 
outside advice source the higher is individual banana outcome.  Where it concerns the 
frequency of consulting an extension officer, we only find positive and significant effects 
within kinship related groups. 
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Table 4.4: Determinants of household heads’ use of at least one productivity enhancing technique 
Kinship   Neighbours Social insurance
network 
At least one technique used 
Coefficient      Significance Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance
Total land (hectares)       0.831 *** 1.046 *** 0.748 ***
Adults present       0.163 0.189 0.208
Sex of household head -0.923 * -0.442  -0.447  
Age of household head       -0.016 -0.012 -0.011
Head received lower primary       0.016 -0.394 -0.611
Head completed primary       0.907 ** 1.182 *** 1.177 ***
Nr of techniques used by 
group members  
0.225      * -0.154 ** 0.043
% lower primary in group 3.912 ** -3.940 x 2.979 *** 
% higher primary in group -2.079 * 0.724  -0.341  
Average age in group -0.049 * -0.088  -0.020  
Constant    -0.152  6.386 x -1.737
Observations       85 93 93
Pseudo R²        0.304 0.296 0.317
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; x significant at 15% 
Table 4.5: Effect of group members advice sources/frequency of extension contact on individual production values (OLS) 
Kinship Neighbours Social insurance network Dependent variable: 
log(monthly banana 
harvest value) 
Coeff.            Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif.
Log (Kibanja hectares)             0.791 *** 0.834 *** 0.704 *** 0.607 *** 0.609 *** 0.620 ***
Log(adults15-65)             0.764 ** 0.465 0.653 ** 0.841 *** 0.436 0.723 **
Sex              -0.228 -0.272 -0.176 -0.275 -0.309 -0.283
Received some primary 0.912            ** 1.092 ** 1.237 *** 0.963 ** 0.820 * 0.839 *
Completed primary             -0.185 -0.352 -0.472 -0.310 -0.287 -0.268
Log(age)             -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
Group members having 
outside advice sources 
0.095            * 0.074 *** 0.105 ***
Group contact with 
extension officer in 1999 
            0.015 * -0.009 x 0.005
% lower primary (group)             1.058 0.598 2.273 -2.635 1.006 1.135
% higher primary             -1.913 * -1.773 * 0.758 1.691 0.443 0.329
Average age             -0.023 -0.035 -0.009 -0.080 0.024 0.015
Constant             8.100 *** 9.613 *** 3.396 12.143 *** 4.641 *** 5.425 ***
Observations             84 84 91 91 91 91
Adjusted R²              0.298 0.298 0.302 0.215 0.288 0.203
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; x significant at 15% 
 
Concluding, we found social effects, either endogenous or exogenous ones, within all three 
groups but the endogenous social effects producing the social multiplier effect, were only 
found within kinship related groups.  We hypothesized that this is due to better 
transmission of information (lower variance of the noise in transmitting information) 
which was acquired by family members.  Supportive to this hypothesis we do find that 
information spillovers (use of techniques, individual outcome effects of group advice 
seeking behaviour) are most prominent in kinship related groups.  However, the individual 
effect of group information appears small relative to the total social effect we found in the 
first sets of regressions (table 4.2).  This leads us to conclude that there are other 
mechanisms besides information spillovers that generate the endogenous social effect. 
5. Conclusion 
We analysed whether social groups affect an individual farmer’s production behaviour.  
The productivity of the East African Highland banana has been decreasing since many 
years due to the declining fertility of the soil, banana diseases and weevil attacks.  In 
Kagera, west of Lake Victoria, the banana is the main staple food and an important cash 
crop.  Therefore it is crucial both for food security and for cash income that this trend be 
reversed.  Farmer extension centres and NGOs alike are trying to introduce new types of 
bananas and productivity enhancing techniques to mitigate the negative effects.  What 
these organisations often observe is that not many farmers seem to be interested in learning 
new techniques and even less so in actually applying them.  In our work we aimed to 
provide evidence that possibly there are externalities of even few farmers learning and 
using techniques.  The true diffusion of techniques is not limited to those farmers who have 
extension contact.  Firstly, farmers will inform other farmers about the techniques so 
knowledge will be spread.  Secondly, if farmers succeed in increasing their productivity, 
this will have positive effects on the productivity of other farmers in their social group. 
We have used a Bayesian framework for updating of a farmer’s beliefs about the benefits 
of a certain technique.  The farmer updates his beliefs each time he observes the true 
benefits of the technique revealed by another farmer actually applying it.  However, the 
farmer does not learn from all farmers in the same way but he attaches more value to the 
outcomes of farmers whom he knows better, in our case who belong to a social group the 
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farmer is part of.  This lead to a social interactions test of the Manski type: individual 
achievement varies with group achievement (endogenous social effects) or with group 
characteristics (exogenous social effects).  We have tackled most of the problems attached 
to this type of social interactions test.  Firstly, we used lagged group productivity instead of 
contemporaneous behaviour to solve the endogeneity problem.  Moreover, we can claim 
that the process is observed out of equilibrium since many farmers do not apply the 
techniques yet.  And most importantly, we know the exact group composition and we have 
data on all group members.  Unlike many authors who are obliged to use datasets not 
designed to analyse social effects, ours was collected with the specific aim of analysing 
social groups.  So we used individual specific groups and group characteristics for our 
analysis. 
We used three different social groups.  In order of exogeneity these are kinship related 
groups, neighbours and social insurance network members.  We found that endogenous 
social effects exist within kinship groups and exogenous effects within neighbour groups.  
The latter effect was due to positive effects of higher primary education of neighbours.  
Following our theory we claim that the endogenous effects within families are at least 
partly caused by information transmission between farmers.  That the effects are largest 
within families is probably due to more meticulous information transmission.  Thus to 
isolate the effects of information we used specific information variables such as the 
number of techniques used by group members, the number of group members having an 
outside (out-of-village) advice source, the frequency of extension contact by group 
members.  Our hypothesis was confirmed by the data: on average the most prominent 
effects of information spillovers were found amongst kinship related groups.   
Thus we can conclude that there is a lot of transmission of information within villages, the 
effects on productivity being largest for kinship related groups.  Those who learn to change 
their production technology from outside sources will further diffuse their knowledge 
within their social groups.  For positive group productivity effects it seems better to target 
farmers belonging to different kinship groups.  Although the latter variable is a strong 
determinant of social insurance group formation and even kinship related groups tend to 
live in the same geographical area, it is not through living close together or through 
forming groups that endogenous social effects in growing bananas come about but through 
long-term (family) relationships. 
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Annexes 
Table A.1: Explanation of techniques to maintain banana plant 
Technique Explanation 
1. Special way of 
digging the hole 
Hole preparation: when digging the 60 cm deep hole, soil from the top 30 cm 
should be heaped on one side of the hole and soil from the other 30 cm on the 
other side.  The top soil should be mixed with organic manure (see next 
technique) and returned to the hole first, in preparation for planting.  If this is 
not enough to fill the hole, top soil from the surrounding areas should be added 
instead of using the bottom soil. 
2. Applying 
fertiliser/manure  
Soil preparation: the best manure to use is farmyard manure from cattle, pigs, 
goats and chicken, also compost or coffee husk humus can be used.  The 
manure (5 debe or 70 kg) should be thoroughly mixed with the top soil and the 
hole filled with this mixture should be left undisturbed for minimum 2 weeks. 
3. Hot water treatment 
of the stem before 
planting 
Cleaning of planting material: weevils are mainly located in the roots and 
corms of the banana plants.  Therefore paring is needed (see “paring”) and in 
addition pared suckers and corms can be immersed in hot water, then sterilised 
and dipped in an appropriate insecticide solution. 
4. Dipping stem in 
insecticide solution 
Cleaning of planting material: before planting, dipping the stem in an 
insecticide solution, used in combination with or without hot water treatment. 
5. Mulching 1 meter 
from stem 
Mulching conserves moisture, controls weeds, contributes to soil fertility and 
reduces soil erosion.  But the mulch should be kept away from the base of the 
plants to prevent superficial root growth. 
6. Trench-manuring Water conservation: the banana plant requires a lot of water and is susceptible 
to drought.  In areas with less then 1000mm of rainfall annually, water 
conservation methods should be applied.  One of the recommended methods of 
rainwater conservation is trench-manuring.  Trenches are dug midway between 
the banana stools.  The bottom of the holes are filled with farm manure and 
topped up with top soil.  Manure absorbs and stores water which the plants can 
use during the dry season.  An alternative to manure is freshly cut banana 
pseudostem. 
7. Paring Cleaning of planting material: weevils are mainly located in the roots and corms of the banana plants.  To reduce the incidence of transferring pests from 
one infected site to a non-infected one when transplanting suckers one can do 
the following: remove the roots and pare the corm and then cut off all weevil 
tunnels. 
8. Desuckering (3 plants 
per stool) 
Ideally there should be 3 plants growing on one stool at varying stages of 
development.  Any more suckers deplete the mat of its vital nutrients and 
provide unnecessary shade. 
9. Harvest hygiene The pseudostem of a harvested banana plant should be cut down at the corm 
level and soil should be put on the surface to reduce weevil attraction. 
10. Weevil trapping It is not the adult weevils that damage the banana plant but their larvae.  Adult 
weevils are strongly attracted to freshly cut pseudostems and corms so they are 
ideal for weevil trapping.  Split pseudostems are placed facing downwards on 
the ground on opposite sides of the stem.  Continuous cleaning of the trap is 
necessary.   
Source: Mbwana, A.S.S e.a. (1998), “A Guide to Growing Bananas in the Eastern African Highlands”, ICIPE 
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Table A.2: Reasons why farmers grow new types of bananas 
Growing other 
Tanzanian 
Reasons for growing (%) 
1st imp 2nd imp 
Declining productivity of indigenous 
plants 
27 15 
Experimentation 64 38 
Advantages of appearance  5 23 
Because others do 5  
For biodiversity  23 
Number of farmers growing/giving 
reasons for growing 
22 13 
 
 
Table A.3: Reasons why productivity enhancing techniques are not used by farmers who do know the 
technique (part 1) 
Reasons for not using techniques  % 
Capital constraint 40 
Do not belief in technique 26 
Not (yet) necessary 3 
Only recently learned 10 
Labour/time constraint 6 
Too difficult 7 
Technique bad for plants 4 
Lack of guidance 4 
Number of techniques known by 
farmers but not used by them  
227 
 
Table A.4: Reasons why productivity enhancing techniques are not used by farmers who do know the 
technique (part 2), by technique 
Reasons for not using 
techniques (%) 
T1* T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 
Capital constraint 62 85 18 27 9 79 30 12 4  
Do not belief in technique 16 2 18 18 18 11 60 24 70 44 
Not (yet) necessary 3 6   9     6 
Only recently learned 5 2 47 18 27  10 12 4 6 
Labour/time constraint 5  6   5   4 28 
Too difficult 8     5  41 7 9 
Technique bad for plants  1  18 18   12 11  
Lack of guidance   12 18 18     6 
* cfr Table A.1 
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Table A.5: Probit regression explaining the existence of a learning link between two households 
 Coefficient Significance 
Heads same age group (difference max. 5 years) 0.025  
Heads of same gender 0.224 x 
Both heads lower primary 0.025  
Both heads higher primary 0.046  
Kinship related households 0.582 *** 
Distance -0.001 *** 
Social insurance members 0.531 *** 
Constant -2.731 *** 
Observations 12210  
Pseudo R² 0.186  
 
Table A.6: Probit regression explaining the existence of an ex ante advice link between two 
respondents 
 Coefficient Significance 
Same age group (difference max. 5 years) 0.143  
Same gender 0.527 *** 
Both received lower primary -0.271 ** 
Both received higher primary -0.003  
Belong to same household 0.345 ** 
Belong to kinship related households 0.325 *** 
Distance -0.000 *** 
Belong to households in same social insurance 
network 
1.029 *** 
Constant -3.475 *** 
Observations 46016  
Pseudo R² 0.254  
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Table A.9: Probit regressions explaining advice seeking behaviour (ex ante) 
Advice from all 
outside sources 
Advice from 
formal extension  
Dependent variable (ex ante): 
Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. 
Gender  0.521 ** 0.484 ** 
Age  0.001  -0.000  
Standard 1-4  0.417  0.457 x 
Standard 5-7  -0.048  -0.068  
Form 1-4 1.254 ** 1.485 *** 
Female adults present -0.201  -0.259 * 
Male adults present -0.055  0.114  
Land (hectare) -0.037  -0.067  
Constant -0.026  -0.233  
Observations 173 173 
Pseudo R² 0.087 0.098 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; x significant at 15% 
 
Table A.10: Probit regressions explaining outside sources of learning 
Dependent variable: Learned from 
outside sources 
Learned from 
formal extension  
 Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. 
Gender of HH head 0.399  0.190  
Age of HH head 0.004  0.009  
Standard 1-4 (head) 0.725 x 0.519  
Standard 5-7 (head) 0.456  0.507 x 
Female adults present -0.030  0.049  
Male adults present -0.087  0.075  
Land (hectare) 0.529 *** 0.373 *** 
Constant -2.020 *** -2.244 *** 
Observations 107 107 
Pseudo R² 0.212 0.180 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; x significant at 15% 
 
Table A.11: Differences between least versus most productive quartiles (relative within group) 
Kin related groups Neighbour groups Social ins. groups  
Lowest 
25% 
Over 
25% 
Single-
sided t 
Lowest 
25% 
Over 
25% 
Single-
sided t 
Lowest 
25% 
Over 
25% 
Single-
sided t 
Gender 51% 53%  45% 51%  45% 52%  
St1-4 73% 81%  63% 83% *** 61% 85% *** 
St5-7 59% 56%  50% 58%  42% 62% ** 
Age 38 45 ** 42 44  43 43  
Adviser 16% 36% ** 16% 38% *** 16% 37% *** 
Teacher 8% 15% x 5% 16% ** 11% 13%  
F adults 1.3 1.6 ** 1.3 1.6 ** 1.4 1.6  
M adults 1.1 1.6 *** 1.1 1.6 *** 1.1 1.6 *** 
Land (ha) 0.9 1.4 ** 1.0 1.3 * 0.9 1.4 ** 
Kibanja  0.5 0.6 x 0.5 0.6  0.5 0.6 * 
Cattle 0.4 0.7  0.2 0.8 x 0.2 0.7  
Durables 24189 106594  29193 102544  24629 102439  
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; x significant at 15% 
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Table A.12: Heckman two-step estimates Cobb-Douglas 
 Coefficient Signif. 
Log(kibanja) 0.672 *** 
Log(adults) 0.793 * 
Male grower -0.325  
Some primary educ. 0.923 ** 
Completed primary -0.183  
Log(age) 0.288  
Constant 6.255 *** 
Selection:   
Children  -0.012  
Durables (index) -0.014 ** 
Log(kibanja) 0.224  
Log(adults) 1.455 *** 
Male grower 0.081  
Some primary educ. 0.384  
Completed primary 0.284  
Log(age) 1.173 ** 
Constant -4.440 ** 
Mills lambda 0.249 ** 
Observations 117  
Uncensored observations 95  
Wald chi² 37.25  
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; x significant at 15% 
Table A.13a: Heckman two-step estimatesa for social interactions, first most productive farmers 
dropped 
(1) Kinship (2) Neighbours 
<300m 
(3) Social Insurance Dep. Variable: 
Log(banana value) 
Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. 
Log(kibanja) 0.779 *** 0.677 *** 0.611 *** 
Log(adults) 0.761 x 0.521  0.870 * 
Male grower -0.082  -0.272  -0.323  
Some primary educ. 0.815 * 0.845 * 1.119 *** 
Completed primary -0.001  -0.278  -0.248  
Log(age) 0.402  0.134  0.277  
Group averages:       
Log(productivity t-1) 0.330 (1.40) -0.394  0.412 ** 
Constant 2.770  10.796 ** 2.214  
Mills lambda 0.277  -0.339  0.548  
Observations 97  109  106  
Uncensored obs. 76  90  85  
Wald chi² 32.35  29.32  34.77  
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; x significant at 15% 
a selection effects not shown in the table 
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Table A.13b: Heckman two-step estimatesa for endogenous versus exogenous social interactions, 
first most productive farmers dropped 
(1) Kinship (2) Neighbours 
<300m 
(3) Social Insurance Dep. Variable: 
Log(banana value) 
Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. 
Log(kibanja) 0.847 *** 0.585 *** 0.604 *** 
Log(adults) 0.794 x 0.781 ** 0.767 ** 
Male grower -0.114  -0.155  -0.323  
Some primary educ. 0.934 ** 0.918 ** 1.057 ** 
Completed primary -0.089  -0.376  -0.272  
Log(age) 0.408  0.109  0.187  
Group averages:       
Log(productivity t-1) 0.354 x -0.814  0.369  
Head some primary 0.433  -1.446  0.706  
Head completed prim -1.932 * 2.936  -0.757  
Log(age head) -1.499  -2.982  0.071  
Constant 8.945  25.192 ** 2.724  
Mills lambda 0.444  -0.232  0.330  
Observations 97  109  106  
Uncensored obs. 76  90  85  
Wald chi² 43.42  38.15  42.54  
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; x significant at 15% 
a selection effects not shown in the table 
 
Table A.14: Fixed effects regressions, two most productive farmers excluded 
(1) Kinship (2) Neighbours <300m (3) Social Insurance Dep: 
Log(banana) Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. 
Log(adults) -0.696 * -0.584 * -0.713 ** 
Log(prod t-1) 0.047  0.407  0.130  
Round3 0.388 *** 0.342 *** 0.397 *** 
Constant 7.862 *** 4.580  7.161 *** 
Observations 99  155  134  
Nr. of groups 58  88  76  
F 5.65 *** 9.86 *** 7.39 *** 
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